Please note that readers may click on items in blue text below for access to supporting documents.

In mid-2009, I learned of a process for reporting suspected internal fraud and wrongdoing within the Internal Revenue Service.  Investigations of such allegations are the responsibility of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, or “TIGTA.”  Both the IRS and TIGTA are entities within the U. S. Department of the Treasury.  At the same time I learned of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process to obtain the IRS’s internal Audit Files.  Due to my observations of GM/IRS collusion, I requested and received the files for both the 2003 corporate and 2005 personal audits, which I received in three phases between July and October 2009.  Information contained in the IRS internal Audit File documents confirmed my suspicions beyond any reasonable doubt that the IRS had conspired with General Motors in the two audits intended to damage me financially and emotionally as a tool to harass me into giving up my franchises.

After receiving the Audit Files, on October 23, 2009 I contacted the IRS Dis­closure Specialist who had provided two of the three phases of documents to inquire about the discrepancies.  He seemed as perplexed as I was about the docu­ment discrepancies and certain oddities in the audit process, and had no explan­ation.  In light of the accumulated overwhelming evidence pointing to GM/IRS collusion, I planned to file a complaint with TIGTA, but wished to delay it until after the IRS would complete its review my 2005 1040X amended return refund claim I filed April 14, 2009.

As noted earlier, the IRS did not even begin its review of my 1040X refund claim until February 2010.  After the review dragged on and on seemingly endlessly, I filed my complaint with TIGTA on June 21, 2010 while the 1040X review was still in process.  The cover letter to TIGTA may be viewed here.  The content of my complaint letter that followed was essentially the same as the letter I furnished to the Revenue Agent Cas Mar on March 1, 2010, including thirty supporting documents.  The TIGTA complaint included a summary of GM’s motive to induce my exit, as well as the various eerie “coincidences” covered earlier in the Dealership History and IRS expanded details.  Following are items discussed in my complaint letter to TIGTA, plus additional IRS audit statistics I obtained after I sent the letter.

Audit File observations and document discrepancies in 2005 tax year audit performed in 2007-2008

Following are discussions about Audit File items included in my TIGTA complaint letter, with actual file documents viewable by clicking on the blue links.

Document supports my initial observation of Manager assigning Agent the task of crafting support for arbitrary disallowance of deduction: The Examining Officer’s Activity Record in the Audit File contains a number of entries that raise very unsettling questions about the credibility of the deduction disallowance determination.  Following are observations supporting that statement:

  • First entry, November 30, 2007: Consistent with my discussion with the Agent in 2005 that a bad debt was deductible in the year it occurred or the year of a triggering event, both of which apply to my case, the Agent attempted to “survey” my return, or accept as submitted with no changes.  At irs.gov, “survey” is defined as follows in the disposal codes (on web page, scroll down to item 32):  “32 Survey After Assignment – A return shall be reported as a survey after assignment if the examiner, after consideration of the return and without contact with taxpayers, or their representatives, and believes that an examination of the return would result in no material change in tax liability.”  The Agent’s desire to survey the return was overridden by his Group Manager (referred to herein as “Manager”), who apparently charged the Agent with the ethically awkward task of finding some basis for crafting a conclusion to support his pre-determined decision with which the Agent didn’t agree.  As according to the AMDISA report to be discussed below, my tax return was assigned to the Agent on February 22, 2007, it is reasonable to assume that the Agent realized at that time that it would be a survey, and thus set it aside as a low priority until it was reviewed nine months later when prompted by some unknown event.  He was already familiar with the deduction as a result of his concurrence with its deductibility in my October 2005 discussion of the issue. In his rejection of the Agent’s survey of the return, the Manager said the bad debt deduction should have been taken in 1995.  However, due to the existence of the consulting agreement that provided means for repayment, it was still a good loan, thus preventing the deduction from being taken until 2005 when the IRS’s disallowance of the agree­ment ended the means of repayment.  So, the Man­ager’s statement about 1995 was invalid as a support for disallowance.  As such, the Manager’s over­riding decision was without basis.  As it is unlikely that the IRS allows a manager to make unsupported arbitrary rulings, the only imaginable reason for his edict is that some­body above him had instructed him to disallow the deduction, and if so, also without support.
  • Toward the goal of finding a basis for disallowance, the Agent’s Plan A (my termi­­nology) was appar­ently to rule out the funds’ loan status due to lack of substantiation, thus prompting his initial request for proof.  When on March 17, 2008, I proved to his satisfaction that they were loans as claimed, Plan A failed.  It then appears that Plan B was to disallow the bad debt deduction based on timing, and Plan C was to disregard the fact that they were loans, and reclassify them as capital contributions.  Plan B could not possibly hold up for reasons discussed herein.  Plan C was selected.  The process that was carried out is certainly indic­ative of a mad scramble to justify the Manager’s decision.
  • Plan C was discussed with the Area Technical Director on 5/12/08 as shown on the Activity Record.  His “seems reasonable” response, however, does not address the issue of whether or not it is the fair and proper ruling, as allowance of the bad debt deduction was apparently not an option for the Agent.  Instead, it would seem that the Agent explained that he was searching for a reason to support disal­lowance of the deduction, and asked the Technical Director if he thought the reclassification theory would work.  The response of “seems reasonable” is a less than resounding endorsement, instead meaning more like, “give it a try.”  Further­­more, the conclusion report shows that the corporation was “thinly capi­talized” based on a debt-to-equity ratio in 2005, ten years after the corpor­ation ceased as the dealership operating corporation.  The ratio analysis should have been performed on the balance sheet of the corporation when the loans were made in the late 1980’s.  The Agent never asked me for that financial inform­ation. The ratio at that time was totally different that it was in the late 1980’s when the loans were made to the corporation.
  • After the Agent’s initial discussion with his Group Manager in November 2007, there was no further entry in the Activity Record of contact between the two until July 23, 2008, the day after the Agent picked up my payment of the tax assess­ment.  It would certainly seem that since the Manager was the one who deter­mined the disallowance at the start, he should have approved the results of the Agent’s disallowance research before the process would proceed, especially since the reason the Agent chose was not even suggested as an option by the Manager.  So, it appears that the Agent had the authority to use any reason he chose, as long as he disallowed the deduction.  It seems that the Technical Director was a detached third party used to “reinforce” the decision, thus keeping the Manager at a dis­tance from the decision and making it appear that the Agent made the disal­lowance determination independently of his Manager.  After the Agent met with the Technical Director, the Activity Record shows that on 5/21/08, “Agent rewrote the narrative for bad debts and capital gains.”  There is no record of what was previously written.
  • The Agent was a GS-13 Revenue Agent, according to the Group Manager’s Con­cur­rence Meeting Check Sheet in the Audit file.  As GS-13 is a high level pos­ition, he is apparently exempt from the Manager concurrence meeting as noted on the bottom of the Check Sheet, and initialed apparently by his Manager.  Also, on the Examination Workpapers Index, it shows that the Concurrence Check Sheet is “Optional for Grade 13 and above.”  As a result of the Agent’s high level, it would seem that a Group Manager would need an especially compelling reason to override his decision to survey (accept as submitted, no changes).  Not only did the Manager not state a compelling reason, the reason he did state was not even valid.
  • The Agent was a GS-13 Revenue Agent during the audit conducted in 2005 for the 2003 corporate return.  The Activity Record for that audit shows that his first contact with his (unnamed) Manager was not made until March 20, 2006, five days after the audit was over and I paid the taxes assessed.  So, it appears that he had the authority to make all decisions, which makes his Manager’s interference years later highly inconsistent and even more questionable.  More­over, it is my understanding that in 2009, the Agent assigned to my two audits was promoted to Group Manager status.

February 13, 2008, letter: two versions:  The February 13, 2008 letter (erroneously dated 2007) requesting proof of loan status I received was not in the IRS Audit File.  How­ever, in the Audit File was a two-page letter addressed to me with the same February 13, 2008 date and showing that it was written by the same Revenue Agent, but not signed.  I did not receive this letter.  The Audit File letter begins with, “Your federal tax return for year(s) shown has been selected for exam­ination,” and also states, “During the course of the examination, it may be necessary to expand or contract the items.”  This language didn’t appear in the actual signed letter I received bearing the same date.  While the Agent didn’t expand his request for documents, after my loan proof docu­ments satisfied his request he did expand the scope beyond simple proof of loans to ultimately reclassify them as capital contributions.  In contrast, the initial examination (audit) notice letter in the 2003 corporate Audit File (first IRS audit, performed in 2005) matches the letter I actually received.

In 2011, I had the opportunity to ask the Revenue Agent about the above document discrepancy.  He responded that the short letter I actually received was one he wrote manually as a Word document so he could get it out quickly.  He said that the unsigned letter was generated automatically at a later date by the computer, so he printed it at that time and put it in the file.  He said that an examination couldn’t be started without printing the letter.  (The AMDISA report shows that on 3/24/08, status 12 occurred, which is “Exam Start Date.”)  The Agent was not able to explain why a copy of the signed letter he actually sent me was not in the file.  He went on to explain that the automatically generated letter (not sent) is a standard IRS letterhead format, whereas the one he manually wrote was not.

With regard to the Agent’s comment that his Word document letter was not the normal IRS form letterhead, I reviewed past correspondence I have received from the IRS in the audits performed in 2005 and 2008, and the 2005 1040X claim reviewed in 2010.  I confirmed that, other than the manually written February 13, 2008 letter, all correspondence I received from both the Revenue Agents and the Managers, including opening and closing letters, contain the same standard computer generated format.  While the manually written letter’s heading includes generally the same information, it is clearly not the same computer-generated format as the others.

The Agent’s description of “getting it out quickly” clearly implies an element of urgency, which is very strange considering the fact that the February 13, 2008, letter was not written until nearly a year after the Agent was assigned my 2005 tax return on February 22, 2007, as shown on the AMDISA report as status 10.  It would certainly seem that some event had to have occurred to cause the sudden urgency after the long period of dormancy.  It is my strong opinion that the urgency resulted from a contact from somebody at General Motors to somebody at the IRS immediately following brief conversations I had with GM CEO Rick Wagoner and two GM Vice-Presidents at a convention on February 9, 2008.  This will be described under the heading “Other Eerie Coincidences” later in this section.

It should be noted that in the first audit, performed on the 2003 corporate return, the audit notice letter dated July 14, 2005 was in the standard computer-generated IRS format, even though it was written just 17 days after the same Agent was assigned the tax return, as opposed to nearly a year’s gap as in 2008.  This reinforces the appearance of extreme urgency connected to the February 13, 2008 manually written letter.  Also, the fact that no copy of the 2008 letter was in the file is consistent with the Agent’s haste to get the letter out quickly, and apparent neglect to make a copy for the file.

June 3 & 4 “Taxpayer Position” discrepancy:  Also included in the IRS Audit File were three documents written by the Agent in a two-day period, June 3 and June 4, 2008.  On the last page of each one is a statement of “Taxpayer Position.”  Each of the documents shows a different statement; one of which is correct, the other two are incorrect.  Interestingly, the correct statement appears on the only docu­ment of the three that I received at the conclusion of the audit in 2008, and the two documents with incorrect statements were only in the internal Audit File I received through the Freedom of Information Act.  The three docu­ments and respective statements are as follows:

  • Workpaper 401-1.6 to 1.11: Exam Procedures/Conclusions (dated 6/3/08): Page 1.11, Taxpayer’s Position: “The taxpayer claims that these were bona fide loans and the bad debt deduction is allowable by Mr. Signer in the year 2005 when the agent disallowed the management fee transaction.”  This version, which the Agent handed to me on June 4, 2008, accurately states my position at the time, which continues today.
  •  Workpaper 401-1.1 to 1.5 – Form 4797: Bad Debts Lead Sheet (dated 6/3/08): Page 1.5, Taxpayer Position: “Tp concedes that these were capital contributions and not loans and as such they are disallowed as bad debts.”  INCORRECT: I DID NOT MAKE, and could not have made, this concession.  The funds were truly loans, to which the Agent stated his agree­ment upon his March 17, 2008 examination of the documentation.  This incorrect statement on the IRS’s internal document is in direct conflict with the Exam Procedures/­Conclusions document written the same day.  Even the IRS doesn’t dispute that the funds were loans; only (erroneously) that they should be reclassified as capital contributions.
  • Workpaper 402-1.1 to 1.5 – Capital Gains & Losses Lead Sheet (Dated 6/4/08):  Page 1.5, Taxpayers’ Position: “Tp position is unknown at this time.”  This is yet a third statement of my position, the actual one of which was well known to the Agent and correctly stated in Workpaper 401-1.6 to 1.11 as discussed above. 

Thus there are three different and conflicting statements, written by the same Agent, about my position in a period of two days.

In addition, the narratives of all three of the above documents contain the following statements:

  • “Furthermore due to the condition of the defunct corporation it could NOT generate income from 1995 through 2005.”  This statement is INCORRECT, as the original corporation DID generate income until in 2005 the IRS said the new corporation couldn’t deduct the management consulting fees any longer.  This income also nullifies the erroneous term “defunct.”
  • “The company had no means of repaying the loans since 1994.”  This statement is INCORRECT, as the management consulting fees provided the means over the years.

The above statements could not possibly be supported, as the original corporation indis­putably had management consulting fee income.  The IRS’s position was merely that the new corporation could not deduct the fees as expenses.  It cannot be disputed that there are countless consulting firms whose only source of income is from consulting fees, and would not be considered “defunct” due to this singular form of income.  (Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines “defunct” as “No longer living, existing, or functioning.”  This does not apply to an ongoing corporation that had $60,000 income in 2003, and filed federal and state tax returns as it had done every year since 1980.)  These statements may have been inserted to attempt to justify the Manager’s (erroneous) position that the bad debt should have been deducted in 1995 when the new MHD corporation became the operating corporation.  While the deduction apparently could have been taken at that time if there had been no consulting fee income, that in­come maintained the loan to me as a good loan until the income stopped as ruled by the IRS.

In 2011, when I asked the Agent about the “Taxpayer’s Position” discrepancies, he said he wrote the second version (“Tp concedes that these were capital contributions…”) to reflect the fact that I had decided not to contest the conclusion.  He was vague about the fact that the statement conflicted with the other statement dated the same day, other than to say he wrote them at different times.  (It should be noted that the Examining Officer’s Activity Record shows that it was not until 7/21/08 that the Agent first learned that I had decided not to contest the conclusion.)  With regard to the third version written on 6/4, he said that he must have cut and pasted from another taxpayer’s form and forgotten to change the taxpayer’s position.

While I am disappointed that the Agent wrote the two incorrect versions, I accept his explanation, as I believe he is an honorable man who would not do anything with malicious intent.  His reluctant damaging disallowance of my bad debt deduction in 2008 was clearly directed by his Group Manager, who overrode the Agent’s desire to survey (accept as filed) my tax return.  It is unfortunate that the Agent was put in this awkward position.

It is noteworthy that in my conversation with the Agent in 2011, he pointed out that the reclassification of the debt to capital contributions would have allowed the loss to eventually offset a capital gain I might make someday.  While that is true, the offset would be at the rate of 15% (current capital gain tax rate) rather than the 33% tax rate I paid on ordinary income in 2005, and would have to wait until I would have a capital gain in excess of $300,000.  Thus, the tax benefit I could possibly realize, if it ever happened, would be approximately $55,000 less than that realized from the bad debt deduction before interest.  Furthermore, I would not receive the tax benefit unless and until I realized a capital gain of more than $300,000.  The only way a capital gain could happen in the foreseeable future would be if I sold my Newark facility (which I would prefer not to do), which even then might generate a loss based on the $2,000,000 sale price of the comparable Fremont Pontiac-GMC facility in Newark in July 2010.  So, it is unlikely that I would ever receive any tax benefit from the capital contribution classification.

In retrospect, it appears that the Agent’s reclassification to capital contribution may have been done to partially mitigate the damage that would be done to me by his Manager’s 11/30/07 mandate that the bad debt deduction be disallowed based on the (invalid) theory that it could have been allowed only in 1995.  As the Agent’s original decision was to allow the deduction as I originally filed it, the reclassification appears to reflect a moral decision by the Agent to salvage some tax benefit for me, while still complying with the Manager’s edict with which he disagreed.  It is noteworthy that in 2010 the IRS reversed its position, and allowed the bad debt deduction, thus upholding the Agent’s initial decision to survey (accept as filed) my 2005 tax return.

Included in the Audit file were two copies of a closing letter from the Agent’s Manager addressed to me that I never received.  Mysteriously, only one was signed, and neither of the copies was dated or mailed.  As the letters would reveal his identity, and possibly open the door for my request for a face-to-face meeting, the withholding of the letters from me is consistent with the Manager distancing himself from the decision.  In contrast, in the 2005 audit of the 2003 corporate return, I received a similar closing letter, 51 days after the time the Agent picked up my checks at the conclusion.  A copy of the letter was in the IRS Audit File.  In 2011, I asked the Agent about the Manager letter I never received.  He didn’t know why I didn’t receive it, explaining the procedure that he prepares the letter for Manager signature, then leaves it in the file that he closes out and forwards to another department for a final review.  It is that department’s responsibility to mail the letter after it completes the review.

AMDISA report showing eerily coincidental dates

Additional questions are raised by the AMDISA report included in the 2005 Audit File.  AMDISA means “Audit Management Display Information System,” followed by the “A” which is a detailed type of AMDIS.  First, Status 08 (“Selected – Not Assigned” per irs.gov) occurred on January 12, 2007 (AMDISA page 2.)  In eerie “coincidence,” this date is exactly one week after my attorney’s January 5, 2007 e-mail to a GM in-house attorney urging GM to settle with me before I filed suit.  This e-mail repre­sented GM’s first knowledge of my involvement of an attorney and possible legal action concerning the multitude of deplorable GM actions I had endured for many years.  Prior to the e-mail, on October 4, 2006, I had presented to GM’s Ann Blakney a detailed history, calculation of damages, and a settle­ment proposal good until December 15, 2006.  In apparent recognition of GM’s huge legal exposure, Ms. Blakney responded with a concerned plea to not file suit (a subject I hadn’t even mentioned), and imme­diate referral of my presentation and proposal to GM senior manage­ment.  I had communication with Ms. Blakney after the October 4 meeting, but certain action items she promised did not occur.  On December 9, 2006 I sent Ms. Blakney an e-mail reminding her of the approaching deadline.  She forwarded my e-mail to a GM in-house attorney, who responded to me on December 14 that my information was in the hands of senior management, and I would hear back “later in January.”  GM’s failure to respond to my proposal in a timely manner is what prompted my attorney’s aforementioned January 5, 2007, e-mail to GM’s attorney.  As is noted in my attorney’s e-mail, as a result of the GM attorney’s December 14 e-mail to me, I made a one-time extension of my offer to January 24, 2007.

Upon receipt of my attorney’s January 5 e-mail, GM undoubtedly realized its options were to, 1. Pay me the amount that I had requested for settlement in October 2006, 2. Attempt to negotiate a lower price, or 3. Reject my proposal outright and force me to sue, in which case GM would seemingly have the advantage through its deep-pocket resources.[1]  Assuming it was GM that prompted the IRS’s January 12 selection of my 2005 tax return, it would seem that the damage value of another audit on me was taken into consideration in GM’s formation of a strategy.  Also assuming GM initiated both the audit of the 2003 and 2005 tax years, it seems it would be upset to learn that the earlier audit backfired by providing me a larger personal tax benefit than the tax assessed on the corporation, and thus would be highly motivated to see the personal deduction disallowed.  As with other statements I make herein, this speculation of GM’s thought process is mine alone, but based on over­whelming circum­stantial evidence.

On January 23, 2007, GM unbelievably responded that senior management determined that my claims had no merit, and declined my proposal.  GM’s in-house attorney e-mailed me a copy of the letter at 11:02 AM Pacific Time.  In eerie “coincidence” later that day, GMAC Sales Purchase Branch Manager Gary Spinella stopped into my dealership without appointment and asked if I had heard from GM, to which I responded that I had, and told him GM’s response.  He then asked what I was going to do, to which I responded that after all I had put up with for so many years, I would take it as far as I had to.  I also told him that my changeover from GMAC floorplan to Wells Fargo Bank would take place February 1.  The notes I made of this contact may be viewed here.  It was quite obvious that GM and/or GMAC had sent Mr. Spinella, whom I had known for many years and considered a friend, to see me in order to plan its strategy to respond to whatever actions I would take.  In eerie coin­cidence with the January 23 events, the IRS AMDISA report (page 1, upper right) shows an Opening Creation Date of January 25.

I filed suit against GM and GMAC (GMAC’s acts were the defamatory and unauthorized information-sharing events in February 2006) on February 21, 2007.  In eerie “coincidence,” the AMDISA report (page 2) shows advancement to Status 10 (“Assigned – No Time Applied”) on February 22, 2007.

As mentioned above, after receiving the Audit File from the IRS Dis­closure Specialist, on October 23, 2009, I discussed the above items with him.  Among his comments was a general statement that if an audit is in Status 10 for a long time, it is probably a survey (no changes).  As previously noted, my case advanced to Status 10 on February 22, 2007, and then remained there until it advanced to Status 12 (“Started”) on March 24, 2008, shortly after the Agent’s March 17 meeting with me.  I would define the thirteen months that mine remained in Status 10 as a “long time.”

Other eerie “coincidences”

In the months that followed my paying of the $111,488 audit tax assessment in July 2008, I connected the dots between some past events that had occurred in eerie “coincidence” with one another.  Additionally, a curious line of questioning of me by GM’s attorney in a January 2009 deposition further solidified in my mind the GM/IRS collusion.  These three occurrences, which led to my decision to file the Form 1040X refund request, are as follows:

1. Signer discussions with GM Chairman and two Vice-Presidents:  Shortly before the February 13, 2008 IRS letter, on Saturday, February 9, I attended the GM/GMAC reception at the National Automobile Dealers Association convention in San Francisco.  At the door greeting dealers upon their arrival were GM Chairman/CEO Rick Wagoner and GM Vice-President Brent Dewar, both members of the senior management staff that had rejected my proposal a year earlier.  I briefly spoke with each one of them separately and explained that my case against GM and GMAC had been in court for a year, and that, while I would take it as far as I needed to, it would be best for all parties if we could settle it.  I handed each of them my business card and urged them to look into the matter when they returned home.  Later that evening I spent time with Vice-Presi­dent Bill Powell, also a member of the senior management team, and communicated the same message to him.  The senior management team members presumably had continuous communication with their offices while they were at the convention, and would presumably have returned to Detroit on Monday or Tuesday, February 11 or 12.  In eerie “coincidence,” it was February 13, 2008, that the IRS Revenue Agent wrote the aforementioned loan proof request letter to me.

It was discussed earlier about the Agent’s explanation in 2011 that he wrote the short, non-standard, February 13, 2008, letter to “get it out quickly.”  This new information from the Agent further reinforces my observation that GM prompted the urgency after I met with its three senior managers four days earlier on February 9.  It is reasonable to assume that immediately before he wrote the letter, the Agent was instructed by a superior to send the letter out promptly.

2. GMAC settlement suggestion timing:  The day after the IRS Agent’s June 4, 2008 presentation of the $111,488 tax bill to me, on June 5 my attorney received a phone call from GMAC attorney Mary Kate Sullivan relative to the lawsuit I had filed on February 21, 2007.  In that call, Ms. Sullivan informed my attorney that GMAC would consider settling on a “nuisance” basis, and then leave us to continue our case with GM alone.  (The term “nuisance” was an absolute insult considering the punitive damages-carrying defamatory act GMAC had performed as named in the lawsuit, as well as the attempted illegal financial information-sharing scheme with GM.)  My attor­ney asked for a proposal, to which GMAC’s attorney refused and requested a monetary demand from us.  We declined this action that would separate GMAC from GM in the inter­twined ordeal.

It is very curious that GMAC’s mention of any interest in settlement, the first after more than 15 months since I filed suit, came the day after I received an IRS bill for $111,488, thus putting me in what would appear to be a vulnerable need for cash.  Even though the amount was a small fraction of what I believed the court would have awarded me, it would seem that a defendant would cer­tainly like to nego­tiate at a time of the plaintiff’s vulnerability, and it would be advan­tageous to know when he or she was vulnerable.  As at the time 470 days had passed since suit was filed, and the June 5 call was GMAC’s first and last men­tion of settlement, the chances are almost non-existent that GMAC would bring it up at that exact seem­ingly fortuitous moment unless it had knowledge of the IRS assessment timing.  It should be noted that the IRS Agent had hand-delivered rather than mailed the conclusion, thus providing immediate confirmation of my receipt and understanding of the amount assessed.  Multiple CPA’s have told me that audit conclusions are normally mailed rather than hand-delivered.  There is thus no doubt in my mind that, through whatever communication line existed between GM and the IRS, GMAC’s attorney was aware that I had received the tax assessment the day before, and thus precisely coordinated the timing of her settlement suggestion.

3. GM attorney questions Signer about damages to be claimed as result of IRS audit:  Included in the documents that I provided to GM in discovery for my lawsuit were certain docu­ments that I believed showed GM’s connection with the IRS audits.  In depositions, GM’s attorney, Greg Oxford, ques­tioned me on those documents and why I felt GM caused the audits, to which I responded with my observations.  During a January 2009 deposition, after hearing the reasons for my belief, GM’s attorney asked me if I would be “claiming monetary damages as a result of the IRS audit.”  He then asked, refer­ring to my belief that GM instigated the audits, “You don’t have any­thing to add to your testimony as to what your reasons for believing that are, do you?”  This would seemingly indicate concern for the fact that I might have indisputable proof.  Later in the deposition he asked for the audit report and records of any communication between the IRS and me.  The deposition by GM outside attorney Greg Oxford may be viewed here.

Considering GM’s attorney’s interest and apparent concern about my knowledge of the GM/IRS connection, it could be reasonably assumed that there was solid basis for it.  If GM were inno­cent of any involvement with the IRS, there could not be any proof of some­thing that didn’t exist, and it would seemingly be advisable for the attorney to ignore the subject.  As it was, by his exploring the subject and a potential damage claim, he ran the risk of sug­gesting a monetary claim that might not have otherwise been made.  So, his questioning further solidified in my mind that GM did, in fact, prompt the IRS audits.  The IRS internal Audit Files I received months later through the Freedom of Information Act removed all doubt.

Additional urgency factors surrounding GM and IRS actions during second IRS audit

Assuming the Agent’s February 13, 2008, loan proof request letter urgency was prompted by GM, it is consistent with GM’s urgency to induce my exit so it could begin construction of its new Fremont Auto Mall facility in order to produce a return on its $13,500,000 expenditure on the property it purchased in late 2007.  Thus, the clock was ticking on the project in which GM planned for one dealer operator to control all GM brands.  Following GM’s purchase of the property, a series of events further connect dots.  Following is a timeline summary:

  • October-November 2007: GM completes purchase of property adjacent to Fremont Auto Mall.
  • 11/30/07 (Friday): IRS Examining Officer’s Activity Record first action.
  • 12/3/07 (Monday): Grant deed executed transferring property ownership to GM.
  • 12/18/07: GM submits rezoning application to City of Fremont.
  • 1/14/08: City of Fremont Planning Department meets with GM about its rezoning application.
  • 1/22/08: Planning Department informs GM that more detail is needed before proceeding.
  • 2/9/08 (Saturday):At NADA convention GM reception, Signer urges three GM senior managers to settle.
  • 2/13/08 (Wednesday): IRS issues notice to Signer requesting proof of loan status to original corporation.
  • 2/27/08: Signer e-mail to GM V. P. suggesting settlement discussion at 3/4/10 Regional meeting.
  • 3/4/08: GM Regional Manager asks Signer, “How can we accelerate the process?”
  • 3/17/08: IRS Agent meets with Signer to review proof of loans.
  • 3/24/08: AMDISA: Status 12 – Examination Start Date (“EXAM-START-DT”).
  • 6/3/08: IRS Agent issues conclusion disallowing bad debt deduction.
  • 6/4/08: IRS Agent presents Signer 6/3 conclusion calling for $111,488 tax payment.
  • 6/5/08: GMAC attorney suggests “nuisance” settlement to Signer attorney.  Signer declines.
  • 6/10/08: GM submits revised plans to City of Fremont showing two separate facilities.
  • 7/22/08: IRS Agent collects $111,488 from Signer.
  • 8/28/08: Fremont Planning Commission approves GM’s rezoning request
  • 9/23/08: Fremont City Council approves GM rezoning request.

Following are additional details expanding upon the above.

  • October-November 2007: GM completes purchase of loading dock facility adjacent to Fremont Auto Mall.  GM entered into contract in mid-2006 to purchase the 9.1 acre site after the two trucking companies occupying the facility relocated to a new facility; relocation occurred in September 2007.  GM’s plan was to demolish facility, then build new facility to house all Fremont and Newark GM brands.
  • 11/30/07 (Friday): Examining Officer’s Activity Record first entry was 11/30/07.   This action, in which the Agent wished to accept my tax return as filed, was described earlier.  As this is first activity since Agent was assigned the tax return on 2/22/07, its timing amid GM’s purchase of the Auto Mall property raises a question of a possible prodding by GM, considering the necessity that GM gain control of my franchises.
  • 12/3/07 (Monday): Grant deed executed transferring property ownership to GM.  This signifies the closing of GM’s purchase of Fremont Auto Mall property, with 12/3 Grant Deed recorded on 12/5.  Purchase price of land was approximately $13,500,000.
  • 12/18/07: GM submits application to City of Fremont for rezoning, including diagram of single facility with three showrooms to house, in some combination, Chevrolet, Pontiac, GMC, Buick, Cadillac, and Saturn.  GM already controls all brands locally except Buick and Cadillac.  Project cannot go forward until GM gets my Buick and Cadillac franchises.
  • 1/14/08: City of Fremont Planning Department meets with GM about its rezoning application.
  • 1/22/08: City of Fremont Planning Department informs GM it requires more detailed plans in order to proceed on rezoning process, which City puts on hold pending receipt of requested information.
  • 2/9/08 (Saturday): At National Automobile Dealers Association convention GM reception, Signer urges GM Chairman Rick Wagoner, Vice-Presidents Bill Powell and Brent Dewar to consider settlement.  Bill Powell asks, “How can we close the gap?”
  • 2/13/08 (Wednesday): IRS issues notice to Signer requesting proof of loan status to original corporation.
  • 2/27/08: Signer e-mail to GM Vice-President Bill Powell suggesting settlement discussion at upcoming 3/4/08 regional meeting.  This was to follow up on the discussion at the 2/13/08 NADA convention.  A primary message of the e-mail was that I am willing to try to settle, but I feel my legal position is strong, and GM needs to be realistic in its offer.  (I felt it had not been at the March 2007 mediation.)  Mr. Powell did not respond to the e-mail, nor did he attend the 3/4/08 meeting.
  • 3/4/08: At Regional meeting, Western Regional Manager Susan Docherty asks Signer, “How can we accelerate the process.”  I responded with the same message that was in the 2/27 e-mail to Bill Powell: I am willing to try to settle, but GM nees to be realistic.
  • 3/17/08: IRS Agent meets with Signer to review original corporation loan proof documentation.  Agent states that he agrees that funds were truly loans, but advises that he will consider if they should be reclassified as capital stock contributions.
  • 3/24/08: AMDISA: Status 12 – Examination Start Date (“EXAM-START-DT”).  This is a lengthy 13 months after the Status 10 assignment of the tax return to the Agent, normally signifying a “survey” as noted earlier by the Disclosure Specialist.
  • 6/3/08: IRS Agent issues conclusion disallowing bad debt deduction and reclassifying fund to capital contribution.
  • 6/4/08: IRS agent meets with Signer to present 6/3/08 conclusion calling for $111,488 payment, including interest.
  • 6/5/08: GMAC attorney contacts Signer attorney to suggest GMAC settlement, but refuses to offer proposal, asks for demand from Signer.  Signer attorney dismisses request for demand that would separate GMAC from GM in lawsuit.
  • 6/10/08: GM submits revised plans to City of Fremont now showing two separate facilities.  Old and new plans may be viewed here, where new plan on the right includes larger Chevrolet/Saturn facility at top, and smaller “Future Auto Dealership” at bottom.   This would allow construction of Saturn/Chevrolet facility to go forward quickly with Inder Dosanjh as the dealer, while leaving Buick-Pontiac-GMC-Cadillac facility project on hold until GM would succeed in inducing my exit.
  • 7/22/08: IRS Agent collects two checks from Signer totaling $111,488 for additional taxes resulting from disallowance of bad debt deduction.
  • 8/28/08: Fremont Planning Commission approves GM’s rezoning request despite Commissioners’ publicly stated disapproval of GM’s treatment of Signer.  This was discussed in 2008 Planning Commission Expanded Details.
  • 9/23/08: Fremont City Council approves GM rezoning request approved Council Members’ publicly stated disapproval of GM’s treatment of Signer.  This was discussed in 2008 City Council Expanded Details.

As the above events unfolded, financial problems mounted for GM, GMAC, and Fremont Pontiac-GMC owner Ken Okenquist, who GM had intended to receive my franchises once it had induced my exit.  Mr. Okenquist closed his Colma Buick-Pontiac-GMC dealership on 9/24/08.  At the same time in the fall of 2008, GM CEO Rick Wagoner appeared before Congress with the CEO’s of Ford and Chrysler to testify on GM’s financial problems while seeking U. S. Government financial assistance.  In December 2008 and January 2009, Ken Okenquist closed his remaining three dealerships, the last of which was Fremont Pontiac-GMC.  With the chaos accompanying the collapse of GM, GMAC, and Mr. Okenquist, nothing further has been done with GM’s Fremont Auto Mall property as of this writing in May 2011.

Mysterious IRS initial withholding of Audit File Documents

The IRS’s response to my request for one of the Audit Files was enough on its own to arouse suspicion, as most of the Audit File docu­ments were withheld from the initial response to my Freedom of Information Act request for the 2005 personal tax return.  On my behalf, in June 2009 my CPA had requested “Audit files and work­papers prepared for the 2005 tax year.”  This is a clear request for the complete file with no stated exclusions.  The first response, which I received in July 2009, produced 73 pages of Audit File docu­ments.  See CPA letter and IRS response here.  Then, using the exact same wording my CPA used in his request, I subsequently requested the files for the 2003 corporate return.  In response, in September 2009 I received 165 pages with many forms and checklists, which made it obvious that the 2005 group of documents was incomplete.  I then did some internet research and learned that the IRS occasionally “sanitizes” the FOIA responses.  I attempted to contact the IRS Disclosure Specialist who produced the 73 pages, and learned that she had retired.  I then contacted the Dis­closure Specialist who supplied the 2003 “good” file, who suggested I write a second request with specific description of what I wanted.  Even though the first request was for the complete file, I did so, and later received an astonishing 423 pages that had been withheld from the first response.

The first (73-page) group of documents produced consisted mostly of items I already had, including my 2005 tax return and documents the Revenue Agent provided me at the conclusion of the audit in 2008.  There were no workpapers in response to my CPA’s specific request.  The second (423-page) group included all of the Audit File documents discussed herein except the AMDISA, a timeline report which contained only seemingly innocent dates.  It is noteworthy that the IRS cover letter with the first group of documents states, in part, “I am enclosing 73 pages of respon­sive documents.”  To unknowing recipients, as my CPA and I were before receiving the 2003 Audit File 165-page response, that sentence would imply that the 73 pages constituted the complete file.  However, it was cleverly worded so it is not a lie, but seemingly intended to impart the conclusion I derived from it.  The deceptive response to my first request is unacceptable, and the withholding of requested documents seemingly violates the Freedom of Information Act that I understand requires that the entire file be provided when requested, less any legally protected items.  None of the withheld documents were legally protected.

TIGTA June 2010 Compliance Activities report reveals percentage of returns examined

Irrespective of all other eerie “coincidences,” the low probability of even having an IRS audit, let alone two, is enough to raise a question of the cause.  A Treasury Department report released in June 2010 provides audit (examination) data, which is discussed below.  As I did not become aware of the report until July 2010, my June 21 report to TIGTA made no reference to the supportive data contained in the report produced by TIGTA itself.  However, since TIGTA produced the report, it is well aware of the low probability.

The U. S. Treasury Department’s Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) released the aforementioned report dated June 10, 2010, titled “Trends in Compliance Activities Through Fiscal Year 2009,” which can be viewed at the Treasury Department’s website by clicking here.  Included in the Compliance Report are statistics showing the numbers and very low percentages of tax returns examined by category for fiscal years 2005 to 2009, further supporting my observation that the IRS audits on my corporation and me personally occurred as a result of GM influence.  Based on the report’s June 2010 publish date, it appears that the fiscal years shown in the report are the years the examinations were conducted, not the tax year being examined.  Following is an analysis of the probability, based on TIGTA data, of each of the two IRS audits being initiated concurrently with two major documents in the Signer/GM conflict by pure coincidence, and without influence by General Motors.

2003 corporation audit performed in 2005:  Don Signer Buick-Cadillac, Inc., is an S Corporation.  The TIGTA Compliance Report shows on page 11 (pdf page 16) that in fiscal year 2005, only 1 of every 338 S Corporation returns filed was examined, or 3/10 of 1%.  That examination rate is expressed as a percentage in a chart on page 40 (pdf page 45,) where it is shown that 10,417 S Corporations were examined that year, which is 0.30% of the approximately 3,500,000 returns in that class.

It goes without saying that with such a low number of returns being examined, the IRS would have to be very selective in devoting its limited examination resources to the most likely sources of revenue.  It would seem that there would be a sufficient number of third party fraud and “Whistleblower” reports, as noted in the 2005 IRS audit expanded details previously discussed on donsigner.com, to cover the 1 in 338 returns that were examined.  Additionally, it would seem that there would be a significant percentage of other bases for examination such as returns with questionable accounting, or those of corporations that had a demonstrated history of tax noncompliance.

As I have clearly stated, I believe the consulting agreement to be the GM-reported target for the audit, with the witch-hunt of virtually all dealership records in an attempt to find anything else in addition, as well as camouflage the true target.  Neither the initial Information Document Request of 17 items, nor my face-to-face discussions with the Revenue Agent indicated any specific basis for the examination.  As noted in the 2005 discussion of the audit in the Dealership History, the IRS found nothing wrong in its extensive examination of documents, with the only change made to the 2003 return by the Revenue Agent being the consulting agreement disallowance.  The conspicuous absence of mention of the consulting agreement in the Document Request would imply, I believe erroneously, that the IRS had no prior knowledge of the consulting agreement, and is consistent with my observation that the final conclusion attempted to disavow any Motors Holding knowledge of the agreement.

The 2003 corporate tax return that was selected for audit was not unusual in any way from tax returns filed in prior years, including sales and profitability levels.  There was no change in accounting practices from prior years, with the same Motors Holding-designated Certified Public Accounting firm having prepared all returns for the corporation since 1996.  (Motors Holding Division had originally required that my corporation engage the medium size, out-of-state, auto dealer specialist firm, which I continued with after buying out Motors Holding in 2000.)  The consulting agreement that would become the focus of the examination had been in effect since 1995.

When the IRS selected my 2003 corporate return for examination in 2005, the only factor different from prior years was GM’s new secret Buick-Pontiac-GMC-Cadillac Fremont Auto Mall plan identical to the one it had denied me.  Following GM’s early 2005 failed efforts to convince me to sell, the secret April 13, 2005 internal GM e-mail series outlining the scheme to induce my exit was followed the next day by the IRS’s internal initiation of the first-ever audit on the corporation.

2005 personal audit conducted in 2008:  The TIGTA Compliance Report shows on page 40 (pdf page 45) that in fiscal year 2008, 1.01% of the approximately 140,000,000 individual returns filed were examined, or only 1 of every 99 returns filed.  As the examination was conducted face-to-face with me at my dealership, the probability of such an action is much lower yet.  Only 0.184%, or 1 of every 543 returns was examined face-to-face as mine was.  On page 9 (pdf p. 14) it states, “Face-to-face examinations are generally more comprehensive and time consuming for the IRS and the taxpayers, and they typically result in higher dollar adjustments to the tax amounts.”

The face-to-face percentages are shown in the Compliance Report as follows:  On page 10 (pdf p. 15) of the Compliance Report, it shows that in fiscal year 2009, only 1 of every 524 individual returns filed received a face-to-face examination, while 1 in 120 received a correspondence examination.  There were even fewer performed in 2008 when my personal return was examined face-to-face.  The 2008 percentage is calculated in the following:  The chart on p. 39 (pdf p. 44) shows that in 2008 (the year the Revenue Agent met with me at my dealership) only 18.2% (253,000 out of 1,392,000 total examinations) of individual Form 1040 audits were done face-to-face, with 81.8% being done by correspondence.  So, of the 1.01% of individual returns that were examined in 2008, only 18.2% of those were done face-to-face, which would indicate that only 0.184% (1.01% x 18.2%) of all individual examinations were done face-to-face that year, or 1 of every 543 returns.

It is very curious that the examination performed in 2008 was done face-to-face considering the fact that 81.8% are done by correspondence, and the documentation requested was very simple: proof that the funds were loans.  The proof consisted merely of promissory notes, proof of repayment, and 1099-INT forms showing that the corporation paid me interest on the loans.  These could have been easily provided by mail, which would have avoided the time and expense of the personal visit by the Revenue Agent.  As it was, the Agent came to the dealership showroom to visit me, which made him very visible to employees, who had also seen him spend several days auditing the dealership’s records in 2005.  Such visibility in both audits could give employees a false suggestion of wrongdoing on my part.  Furthermore, the final conclusions were delivered face-to-face to the dealership showroom in both 2005 and 2008.  Several CPA’s I have discussed this with have been surprised at this hand-delivery of conclusions, as they say they are normally mailed.  If my observation that the IRS audits were conducted as GM-instigated harassment is correct, these multiple rare high visibility showroom visits are certainly consistent.

Probability of two audits occurring:  As TIGTA data shows that only 1 in 338 returns are audited, it would follow that the majority of S Corporations are never examined.  For individuals, at one in 99 being audited, it would indicate that only about half of all taxpayers are ever audited in their income earning lifetimes.  As noted above, the rarity of an audit is enough to raise a question of the cause in the event that one is conducted.  In my case, GM had the Fremont Auto Mall motive to induce my exit in 2005, which is the year the 1 in 338 chance corporation audit (the first ever) was initiated.  Then later, GM learned that I would challenge their actions in court in 2007, which is the year the 1 in 99 chance personal audit (the first ever) was initiated.  The chance of both audits being initiated by sheer chance, or coincidence, in the same years of the two major GM/Signer documented events would be 1 in (338 x 99), or 1 in 33,462. 

Those odds are low enough to all but eliminate the terms “chance” or “coincidence” from the audits’ occurrences.  But, there is more.  Each of the audits was initiated within a week (the corporation within a day) of the documented major triggering events: GM’s April 13, 2005 exit inducement scheme e-mail, and my attorney’s January 5, 2007 first notice to GM of potential legal action.  There is only a 1 in 52 chance that the audit would be initiated within the same particular week in each case, thus reducing the chances of coincidence even further.  Thus, the chance of the corporate audit being initiated in the same week of the same year of the e-mail is 1 in (338 x 52) or 1 in 17,576.  The chance of the personal audit being initiated in the same week of the same year of the e-mail is 1 in (99 x 52) or 1 in 5,148.

The chance of both first-ever audits being initiated in the respective weeks of the documented triggering events would be 1 in (17,576 x 5,148), or 1 in 90,481,248.

Again, this calculation is based on TIGTA’s own audit percentage figures.  And, it does not even take into account factors the other two factors named above: the fact that the first audit was initiate the very next day, and the fact that the second audit was done on a rare and unnecessary face-to-face basis.  Nor does it account for the multitude of other eerie “coincidences” and unusual events, all of which make the chance of the audits being coincidence even more remote.  It seems that it would be impossible for any reasonable person to believe that GM wasn’t involved, thus taking the audits from the realm of chance to the realm of sure thing based on specific purpose.

Audit process event timing inconsistencies

A comparison of the 2003 and 2005 tax year audits reveals considerable inconsistencies in the timing of the events in the process.  A chart (Excel)  (PDF file) shows the sequence of events of the two audits beginning with the dates the IRS received the returns, which is designated as Day 0.  Since I have never seen IRS Audit Files before, and neither has my CPA, I can only compare one to the other.  The order of events is different between the two, but I will focus on the date the respective tax return was received, the first event in the audit process, Status 10, Status 12, the appointment letter, and the conclusion.  Following is a table of the sequence timing of the two audits.

Event dates compared 2003 Gap in days 2005 Gap in days
Return received to 1st event* 396 178
Status 10 to appt. letter 17 356
Status 10 to Status 12** 42 396
1st event to conclusion issued 193 508

* Large difference in initiation timing between two audits.  In each case, first event coincided precisely with a significant GM event.
** According to the IRS Disclosure Specialist, if an audit is in Status 10 for a long time, it is probably a survey.  396 days in 2005 is a long time, while in contrast the 2003 audit moved promptly along from Status 10 to Status 12.

Summary of eerie “coincidences” in two IRS audits

When viewing a chronological list of various events with parallel timing between GM and IRS actions, it is impossible to dismiss the probability of a connection between the two entities.  Following is a summary of the eerie “coincidences” discussed herein.  The first two are discussed in the Expanded Details: “(2005b) First IRS Audit.”

  • #1: 04/13/05: GM internal e-mail sequence outlines scheme to induce Signer’s exit
    04/14/05: IRS 2003 Audit File first action date: Opening Creation Date 
  • #2: 07/25/05: GM debits Signer $20,302 day after two-week malicious warranty audit
    07/27/05: IRS mails audit notice written 7/14/05 to Signer
  • #3: 01/05/07: Signer Attorney advises GM Attorney to settle before possible legal action
    01/12/07: Signer 2005 personal return IRS Audit File first action date: Status 08
  • #4: 01/23/07: GM Attorney letter to Signer Attorney, “claims have no merit”
    01/23/07: GMAC employee asks Signer plans, Signer will go as far as necessary
    01/25/07: IRS Audit File second action date: Opening Creation Date 
  • #5: 02/21/07: Signer files suit against GM and GMAC 
    02/22/07: IRS Audit File third action date: Advancement to Status 10
  • #6: 02/09/08: Signer suggests settlement consideration to GM Chairman and 2 V-P’s
    02/13/08: IRS Agent writes letter requesting proof of loans
  • #7: 06/04/08: IRS Agent presents bad debt disallowance and  $111,488 tax assessment
    06/05/08: GMAC attorney suggests “nuisance” settlement

The probability of these parallel timed IRS events being linked to GM can be evaluated using the deck of cards example in “What are the odds?”  Since the dates in each pair of events occurred within a week of each other, in fact most within two days, the 52-card deck example could be considered representative of 52 weeks in a year.  Like with the card drawing example, an observer knowledgeable of the probability chart could accept the fact that one or two of the event pairs might be innocent coincidences absent of GM-GMAC/IRS communication.  While it is possible that even more than two are innocent coincidences, odds are astronomical against them all being just that.  If any ONE of the seven events involved communication, and thus a conspiracy, between GM and the IRS intended solely to damage me, it is absolutely unconscionable.

In addition to the above, there are the other previously discussed highly unusual events surrounding the 2005 tax year audit that suggest something is seriously wrong.  The chances of any of the following items occurring in any audit would also seem to be very slim, and the chances of so many in the same audit without special influence are virtu­ally non-existent, thus increasing the odds of GM involvement even further.  Following are some of the other mysterious items discussed earlier:

  1. 423 Audit File pages withheld from initial FOIA response, seemingly illegally.
  2. Group Manager’s seemingly rare override of GS-13 Agent’s decision his after review of 2005 personal return.  Agent’s attempt to survey (accept as submitted) return was based upon substantial logical support, but was rejected by Manager.
  3. Group Manager made disallowance decision without valid reason, and then apparently assigned Agent the task of finding something to support it.  This should never occur.
  4. Three different strategies created to justify disallowance of bad debt deduction, none of them valid in my opinion.  It would seem that an IRS disallowance of any deduction should have one clear reason for the IRS’s decision, even if the taxpayer disagrees.  In my case, none of the three proposals were clearly sup­portive of disallowance, and the one chosen out of the three was only considered “reasonable” by the IRS Technical Director.
  5. Three different Audit File versions of taxpayer statement, two of which were incorrect, written by the same person on June 3 and 4, 2008.
  6. Agent’s actual February 13, 2008 manually written loan proof request letter not in Audit File, but in its place is unsigned letter in the standard IRS format.  Agent’s action to “get the letter out quickly” implies curious urgency after almost a year, strongly suggesting connection to my conversations with GM senior management four days earlier.
  7. Two copies of undated Group Manager letters to me in Audit File, neither of which was mailed.  This should never happen.
  8. Audit remained in Status 10 for 396 days (13 months,) normally indicating a survey per Disclosure Specialist.  In contrast, the 2003 tax year corporate audit was in Status 10 for only 42 days.  It would seem that an extremely small percentage, if any, of returns remaining in Status 10 for 13 months would continue to examination.  Additionally, common sense would indicate that the relatively high dollar amount involved would make collection a high priority if the IRS’s position of non-deductibility were legitimate.

It would seem that each one of the above eight highly unusual events would have extremely low odds of occurring in any audit without special influence, probably ranging from the 1% to 5% range.  To be generous, even if each of the above happens in one in ten audits, or 10%, the chances of all occurring in the same audit would be 1 in 10 times 10 eight times, or one chance in ten billion.  And this would further compound the low odds of the parallel timed events discussed above.  Con­sidering the number and nature of discrepancies in the Audit File, there is no way that collectively they can all possibly be explained away as errors and coincidences.


GM had a clear, longstanding, although grossly ill-advised, motive to engineer my demise as an element of its Newark market takeover plan.  While it is possible that one or more of the many damaging items discussed are innocent errors or coincidences, it is virtually impossible that all of them are.  Based on the facts presented herein, I firmly believe that GM insti­gated the audits in which the IRS coop­erated in the highly unethical conspiracy.  Assuming my obser­vations are correct, I consider actions by both General Motors and the Internal Revenue Service to be abso­lutely despicable, bringing into question the very foundation of tax fairness and impar­tiality in the United States of America.

TIGTA’s response to my June 21, 2010 complaint was as bizarre, if not more so than what I have experienced with GM and the IRS over the years.  An account of TIGTA’s response may be found in Expanded Details, “(2010-2011) U. S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Office Commits Cover-Up of Signer Allegations.”

[1] In an ironic twist of fate, little more than two years later, it was GM that failed financially and filed bankruptcy.  In further nauseating irony, GM received over $50 billion in bailout funds from the U. S. Treasury Department under which the IRS operates.